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CAMG Combat Support Axioms 
Brigadier General Strom Thurmond, United States Army Reserve 
This article supplements "CAMG 
Operations in Atomic Age Warfare" 
written by Brigadier General Strom 
Thurmond and published in the Jan­
uary 1958 issue of the MILITARY RE­
VIEW.-Editor. 
LE primary objective of civil affairs 
and military government operations 
(CAMGO) is to provide CAMG combat 
support. Toward this end, all energies, all 
actions, and all thought must be focused. 
For this reason, CAMGO personnel de­
vote themselves to acquiring a more spe­
cific, a more practical understanding of 
the combat commander's needs and prob­
lems and of the CAMG support that they 
can give him to assist in accomplishing 
fully the combat mission which has been 
assigned to him. 
Before proceeding it would be well to 
decide what is meant by the term CAMG 
combat support. 
Referring to the Dictionary of United 
States Army Terms, published by the De­
partment of the Army in November 1953, 
as Special Regulations 320-5-1, we find 
that combat support is defined as: "op­
erational assistance furnished combat ele­
ments." 
After considering also the definition, 
therein, of such other terms as combat 
element, tactical element, and tactical 
troops, the following synthesis is sub­
mitted: 
CAMG combat support is CAMG op­
erational assistance furmshed in a 
combat operation. CAMG troops pro­
vide CAMG operational assistance in 
direct support of combat troops, and 
are engaged under a combat com­
mander, to operate as a part of his 
unit in combat. 
Communism 
Another basic CAMGO objective is to 
support and implement our national poli­
cies. Foremost of these policies is to com­
bat and neutralize Communist social and 
political orientation of an area liberated 
by military force from Communist control. 
The combat commander, as the one per­
sonally responsible for achieving CAMGO 
objectives, must be fully cognizant of these 
political military objectives of the Armed 
Forces of our country. He is the one who 
must constantly consider the human, po­
litical, and economic aspects of the area 
of his combat operations. The CAMG or­
ganization at his disposal is the instru­
ment with which he removes or neutralizes 
all Communist influences in areas occu­
pied by the military forces he controls. 
Any neglect of this responsibility will 
cause a vacuum quickly filled by Commu­
nist oriented policy. 
Of value in this connection is a little­
known study of the three years of intensive 
Communist CAMG planning and subse­
quent occupation of a community entitled 
The Reds Take a City: The Communist 
Occupation of Seoul, by John W. Riley, Jr., 
and Wilbur Schramm, and published in 
1951. 
It is evident that our own CAMG plan-
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ning must include a full comprehension of 
Communist CAMG planning. As a mini­
mum, our CAMG planning must be di­
rected at neutralizing the effectiveness of 
Communist aggressive efforts. 
Furthermore, we must be constantly 
vigilant in our awareness that, as an in­
strument of foreign policy, CAMG is for 
us as it is for the Communists a weapon 
for waging war. It is an adjunct to other 
military weapons, perhaps, but, neverthe­
less, an essential military accessory for 
winning not only the war, but also the 
peace. 
Military versus Civil Authority 
Still another basic objective of CAMG 
operations is to provide for the early 
transfer of responsibility from the mili­
tary commander to a designated civil 
agency of government. 
CAMGO personnel are not engaged in 
social or economic experiments or studies 
for their own delectation or for academic 
professional interest. 
The CAMGO job is to get things done 
as expeditiously as possible, to achieve 
actual military operational objectives, and 
to withdraw as soon as the military opera­
tional need has been met. 
The pace is quick, not leisurely. 
It must be kept in mind that prolonged 
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military occupation is not the task before 
us. 
Transfer to Civil Control 
In order to facilitate the smooth trans­
fer of control, civilian organizations un­
der military supervision should be intro­
duced early in the more stable parts of 
the area of operations and gradually re­
place specialized CAMG units and activ­
ities. 
It is a cardinal rule, though, that there 
cannot be divided responsibility for the 
control of an area. Either the civil or the 
military authority must control the area. 
The agencies of either, however, can be 
used to support the other before and after 
the transfer of control, which must be ac­
complished smoothly, whether control is 
being transferred from civil to military 
authority or from military back to civil 
authority. 
Historical examples of civilian organi­
zations which served under military con­
trol are the United Nations Relief and 
Rehabilitation Administration (UNRRA) 
in World War II and the International 
Cooperation Administration (ICA) in 
Korea. 
Such civilian organizations, under the 
control of the theater army commander, 
and in turn under the supervision of his 
G5, definitely reduce the requirement of 
CAMGO personnel. CAMG units replaced 
move forward to augment the CAMG com­
bat support units. 
International Obligations 
The remaining objective basic to CAMG 
operations is to comply with international 
treaties, agreements, or customary law. 
For this reason, among others, there is 
in the modern nuclear age army a fifth 
general staff section concerned with all 
military-civil. matters including the gov­
ernment, economy, inhabitants, and insti­
tutions in areas where United States 
Armed Forces are employed. 
This ensures that the combat commander 
is properly advised of his responsibilities, 
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of the limitations on his courses of action, 
and of his capabilities deriving from polit­
ical, economic, and societal factors. 
In his estimates of the combat situa­
tion, the combat commander carefully 
weighs these civil affairs and military 
government factors along with those deal­
ing with personnel, intelligence, opera­
tions, and logistics. 
The combat commander's decisions are 
influenced not only by his own and the 
enemy's relative combat power and dispo­
sition of forces, and not only by such fac­
tors as weather and terrain, but also by 
civil conditions in the area of his combat 
operations. 
CAMG Activity 
The CAMG activity is not new to the 
Army; only the organization of that ac­
tivity is fairly recent. 
Our CAMG experiences during World 
War I, and the preceding foreign mili­
tary engagements of our Armed Forces, 
strongly indicated early in World War 
II the urgency and importance of organiz­
ing the CAMG activity that inevitably 
accompanies combat operations. 
The scope of the CAMG activity is vast; 
the details of possible actions are numer­
ous; and volumes could be written on each 
functional segment of the CAMG activity. 
Because generalizations often seem 
vague, there is a need to search assidu­
ously for clear, complete axiomatic state­
ments to identify the elements of CAMG 
activity. 
Concrete definitions are needed, suffi­
ciently comprehensive in scope and in con­
veying understanding, of the practical part 
performed by CAMGO personnel as an 
operational element in the combat com­
mander's organization. 
Toward this end, axioms of CAMG com­
bat support will be explored in an effort 
to determine how to achieve the basic ob­
jectives of CAMG operations previously 
mentioned. 
Were warfare conducted in an arena set 
apart, such as the jousts of medieval 
knights, or as in many modern military 
maneuvers on military reservations, the 
combat commander could limit his con­
cern to the factors of terrain and weather 
and the dispositions of friendly and en­
emy forces, their firepower, and capabili­
ties. However, this is not the way it actu­
ally happens on the fields of battle. 
Wherever we fight there are people, 
except perhaps in certain parts like the 
interior of deserts, at sea, or in an arctic 
r egion. It is because people interfere with 
war and war interferes with people that 
military commanders must consider the 
effect on projected combat operations of 
people, their actions, attitudes, institu­
tions, and resources. 
Combat Commander Responsible 
Independence of action often results in 
the belief that subordinates concerned with 
particular CAMG matters are responsi­
ble for CAMG operations. 
This is far from true and we must re­
emphasize again that the responsibility 
for CAMG operations is lodged only in 
the military commander of the area to 
whom CAMG authority has been dele­
gated, whoever he may be, and regardless 
of whatever other concerns he may have. 
The CAMG mission is part of the com­
bat commander's mission. He must ac­
complish it even without using the CAMGO 
personnel and units specifically designated 
and available to him. 
The CAMG organization assists the com­
bat commander as any other service as­
sists him in its particular sphere, but he 
is responsible. 
Specially trained CAMGO personnel, 
backed by CAMG organizations extending 
from the front to the rear through all the 
echelons of command, increase the combat 
commander's CAMG capability many hun­
dredfold. 
And, what is equally important, the 
combat commander is not compelled to 
divert from combat tasks personnel whose 
6 MILITARY REVIEW JANUARY 1959 
special training and competence is needed 
elsewhere to engage with the enemy. 
Combat Element 
It is the combat element which first con­
tacts the civilian element upon the initial 
entry of our Armed Forces into enemy­
held territory. It is the combat commander 
who first establishes the military control 
which must later be transferred to a civil 
agency. 
The manner in which the people are 
handled at this early moment by the com­
bat commander determines their first and 
most lasting attitude toward our Armed 
Forces. That attitude may become actively 
hostile or passively neutral. On the other 
hand, that attitude may be cultivated to 
become one of cooperation and, perhaps, 
even result in active assistance to the op­
erations of the combat commander. 
In view of the tremendous drain upon 
our own resources of modern atomic-age 
warfare, it is essential that maximum 
utilization be made of the resources, in­
cluding manpower, in areas where our 
Armed Forces are employed. 
While it is true that international law 
requires the combat commander to restore 
and maintain public order and safety and 
to provide for the well-being of the inhab­
itants of an area coming under his mili­
tary control, the combat commander can 
do this in such a way as will contribute to 
his combat success. 
Conversion Process 
The conversion of formerly enemy-held 
territory to reinforce and even augment 
the commander's combat power, in terms 
of resource utilization, is a significant as­
pect of CAMG combat support. 
A paradox arises, however, in this 
CAMG conversion process. In order to ex­
ploit efficiently and effectively the resource 
potential in support of combat operations, 
it is not only necessary but also desirable to 
comply with the provisions of interna­
tional law regarding restoring and main-
taining public order and safety and provid­
ing for the well-being of the inhabitants. 
In the resulting climate of good will, 
CAMG personnel, by working through 
civil officials, can make labor available for 
building military roads, bridges, ware­
houses, bunkers, and other facilities. They 
can locate and cause to be utilized for mil­
itary purposes sawmills, stone quarries, 
workshops, pure water sources, stockpiles 
of construction materials, raw and proc­
essed materials, and many other civilian 
supplies, services, and facilities. 
CAMG Weapon 
In the search for weapons of greater 
combat effectiveness, it is found that the 
CAMG weapon, as an instrument of the 
foreign policy of our Government, has 
proved itself on many battlefields through­
out the world. It delivers on the ground, 
in the combat environment, an augmenta­
tion of combat power-in terms of usable 
resources---0f tremendous magnitude. 
Every person, organization, and echelon 
in the military structure, from the front 
to the rear, is required to contribute to 
the support of combat operations. This is 
equally true of the CAMG organization, 
and all CAMG actions must be directed 
toward this common goal, even at the ex­
pense, if necessary, of long-range rehabil­
itation and reconstruction programs in 
rear areas. 
Personnel Competence 
It is of primary importance not only to 
have the CAMG organization, as such, 
but also to have the technological and pro­
fessional competence of CAMGO person­
nel brought to peak efficiency for func­
tioning in the combat environment. 
Because CAMG concerns primarily are 
operational in nature, it is necessary that 
CAMGO personnel be thoroughly grounded 
in the various aspects of military science 
and tactics. To perform their part in com­
bat operations, CAMGO personnel must 
have a comprehensive knowledge of the 
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functions of the G3 section. Only in this 
way can they understand how the G5 sec­
tion plays its operational role in the in­
tegrated staff of the combat commander. 
The precept of Thomas Paine unquali­
fiedly applies: "Where knowledge is duty, 
ignorance is a crime." 
It is the duty of every CAMG officer to 
qualify himself fully as an alter-ego to 
the combat commander, capable of con­
tributing to estimates of the combat 
situation and of participating in the for­
mulation and implementation of combat 
decisions. 
Combat Support Tasks 
The exploration for axioms of CAMG 
combat support reveals that there are cer­
tain actions which are conditional while 
there are others which recur in all cases. 
It may be concluded from this that CAMG 
ccmbat support has two categories of 
tasks-conditional and recurring. 
Conditional tasks are such as arise out 
of United States policy with regard to a 
particular area and the limitations im­
posed by the natural conditions of the 
area. 
Recurring CAMG combat support tasks, 
on the other hand, may be defined, in gen­
eral, as: gaining assistance and avoiding 
interference of the inhabitants, their econ­
omy, and institutions in areas where 
United States Armed Forces are engaged 
in combat. 
More specifically stated, recurring 
CAMG combat support tasks fall into six 
additional categories: 
1. Civil conditions.-Preventing and 
suppressing disease, starvation, unrest, 
and other conditions which derive from 
combat relationships and which would 
handicap or obstruct tactical and logistical 
operations; and combating enemy efforts 
to exploit such conditions. 
2. Resource utilization.-Promoting the 
availability and utilization of local re-
sources, facilities, and services, and of 
governmental, economic, and social agen­
cies, for the benefit of the tactical and lo­
gistical effort; and denying their use to 
the enemy. 
3. Civil security.-Assuring the secu­
rity of combat troops from civil sources; 
using public safety agencies· to eliminate 
active and passive sabotage and guerrilla 
activity; and coordinating civil defense 
with military area security and damage 
control operations. 
4. International law.-Complying with 
international law and agreements. This 
includes provisions for restoring and main­
taining public order and safety, for civil­
ian relief supply, and for the care and 
movement of civilian war and disaster 
victims, such as casualties, refugees, evac­
uees, concentration camp internees, dis­
placed persons, and other needy persons. 
5. Civil authority.-Reestablishing civil 
authority; transferring the area from mil­
itary to civil control; and providing as­
sistance to established civil authority in 
emergencies and disasters and, where in­
dicated, in the routine conduct of govern­
ment. 
6. Military-civil matters.-Providing a 
focal point for handling all military-civil 
matters and, thereby, avoiding a diversion 
of combat and other military personnel 
from their primary military tasks by con­
cern with civil as well as with military­
civil matters. 
Conclusion 
This presentation is intended only to be 
suggestive of the vast range of CAMG 
combat support. A great deal of effort is 
yet required to define in practical terms 
all aspects of the CAMG capability to sup­
port the combat commander's operations. 
There must be a mutual understanding 
on the part of combat commanders and 
CAMGO personnel of the responsibilities 
and capabilities of each in this increas­
ingly vital field. 
The Role of Ciuil Affairs and Military Gouernment 
General Lyman L. Lemnitzer 
Vice Chief of Staff, United States Army 
The importance of CAMG outlined in the pre­
ceding article by Strom Thurmond was under­
scored by General Lyman L. Lemnitzer, Vice 
Chief of Staff of the Army, in an address to the 
Military Government Association at its annual 
conference at Augusta, Georgia, on !!5 October 
1958. The MILITARY REVIEW presents excerpts 
of the Vice Chief of Staff's address.-Editor. 
BASICALLY, the role of civil affairs 
and military government today may be 
said to be unchanged from what it has 
been in the past. Simply stated, that is to 
relieve commanders of combat units of the 
problem of administering the local popu­
lation in the zone of operations; and be­
yond that, to influence the civilian popu­
lation so that their cities and facilities not 
only cease to be liabilities but become as­
sets. While the conditions which can be 
expected in modern war greatly compli­
cate this task, the task itself is in princi­
ple the same obvious, basic one which has 
always existed in war. 
An important part of our chances for 
success in any undertaking in the future 
depends upon the soundness of the actions 
which we take in the present. This fact 
emphasizes the importance of some of the 
major functions which are performed by 
the Chief of the Civil Affairs and Mili­
tary Government agency in the Depart­
ment of the Army Staff. 
In my opinion, the development of clear 
understanding of civil affairs and mili­
tary government functions throughout the 
Army and the maintenance of CAMG 
units which are ready to perform their 
functions promptly in case of emergency 
are of greater importance today than ever 
before. 
One of the characteristics of a nuclear 
war would be a great expansion in the 
area of the combat zone, with a corre­
sponding increase in the number of people 
who would be caught in the path of the 
combat forces. Another pertinent factor 
would be the mass hysteria which the use 
of atomic weapons, or even the rumor of 
such use, might well be expected to cause 
in the civilian population of the combat 
zone. Still a third significant point to be 
noted is the greater tactical dispersion of 
combat units which would prevail. Finally, 
there is the fact that an atomic battlefield 
would be marked by extreme destruction. 
All of these characteristics combine to 
intensify the importance of the civil af­
fairs and military government role. If 
ground combat units are to operate success­
fully in a nuclear war-and their success­
ful operation will be an essential element 
of victory-they must be able to concen­
trate rapidly from dispersed positions, to 
strike swiftly in exploitation of their nu­
clear strikes, and to disperse again quickly. 
The emphasis in each of these phases, as 
I have indicated, is on speed. But if the 
roads and the countryside are thronged 
with refugees it will not be possible to 
move speedily, and it may not be possible 
to move at all. 
In short, in future operations, whether 
or not atomic weapons should be used, the 
responsibilities of civil affairs and mili­
tary government will not only be no lighter 
than they have been in the past, but in all 
probability will be tremendously magni­
fied. Therefore, we cannot sit back and as­
sume that the organization and doctrine 
to carry out these vital functions can be 
created after hostilities begin. We must 
make every possible preparation now, so 
that in case of emergency the urgently 
n_eeded steps could be taken promptly and 
efficiently. This is a need which, I am 
glad to say, is generally recognized and 
which is being met by a continuing and 
effective effort. 
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